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VENDOR'S EJECTMENT.
One who has the legal title to land, of which another is in
possession, may bring an ejectment, and recover, unless some
equity is brought into view at the trial, on account of which
a chancellor would enjoin against the prosecution of the eject-
mnent to judgment and execution. Although one has made, or is
alleged by the defendant to have made, a contract of sale, under
which another has the right of possession, he may begin the eject-
ment. His motive in doing so may be to disown the alleged equity
of the vendee1 or to constrain the vendee to fulfil on his part, the
contract. It is not necessary that, when he begins the suit, he
should declare which of these he has in view'. Courts of law in
Pennsylvania administer, in ejectment, equities springing from the
contract of purchase which would induce a chancellor to stay, abso-
lutely or conditionally, the suit by the plaintiff. As the chancel-
ior will condition its injunction upon the vendee's fulfilling his du-
ties, and the vendor is aware of this, the vendor may institute the
ejectment for the purpose of constraining the vendee either to
abandon the possession, or to perform the contract. The eject-
ment, from this point of view becomes a substitute for a vendor's
"The ejectment may be brought in denial of any contract. The defencd-
ant may prove the contract and thus protect his possession. McClure v.
Jones, 121 Pa., 55o; Webster v. Webster, 43 Pa., 161. To make improbable
the existence of a contract, the plaintiff may claim that he has constantly
paid the taxes during the defendant's occupancy. On the other hand the
defendant may show that he has been making valuable improvements; Mc.
Clure v. Jones, snfra.
2Lauer v. Lee, 42 Pa. x65.
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bill in equity for specific performance'. Its object is, .not to re-
scind the contract2 unconditionally, but only if the vendee fails to
perform according to the requirements of the judgment of the
court.
Retention of Legal Title.
The vendor's action presupposes that he still retains the legal
title. If he has conveyed the land, it is no longer practicable'.
A grantor cannot resort to ejectment simply to enforce the per-
formance by the vendee, of the consideration. The promise or
covenant for the consideration must have been also a condition;
the conveyance must have been subject to its performance, to en-
title the grantor to eject the defaulting grantee. The grantee
Promising as the consideration, to furnish food, fuel, shelter, main-
tenance generally, to the grantor, the latter cannot enforce per-
formance by ejectment5 . When the vendee has done.all that un-
der the contract he must do, to entitle himself to the deed, the
vendor will be treated as if he had done what he *ought to have
done, i. e conveyed, and will not be allowed to employ ejectment
to compel the further performance by the vendee of the contract.
But, when the vendee, in order to entitle himself to a conveyance,
is both to pay a sum of money to the vendor and other sums to
creditors of the vendor', paying the vendor the sum he is to receive
without paying the creditors, does not entitle him to a deed, nor
'Shaw v. Bayard, 4 Pa., 257. Carmalt y. Platt, 7 W. 318; Riel v. Gan-
non, 161 Pa, 289. Creigh v. Shatto, 9 W. & S. 82. Yet in Hawk v. Green-
sweig, a Pa. 295, Rogers, J., says that the ejectment must be considered a bill
in equiti, not to enforce specific performance but to cancel the contract.
,Carmalt v. Platt, 7 W. 318. The fact that the vendee has made improve-
ments is immaterial when, because of the inability of the vendor to make a
good title, he elects to rescind and to compel compensation from the ven-
dor. Carmalt v. Platt, Siuefra: Miles v. Williamson, 24 Pa. 135.
3Mvers v. Myers 25 Pa. ioo. Megargel v. Saul, 3 Wh. i9; Heacock v
Fly, 14 Pa. 54o; Adams v. Farrell, 26 Sup, 641; Kauffelt v. Bower 7 S. & R.
64; Cook v. Trimble, 9 W. I5,; Vaughan v. Ledyard, 14 Phila. 176; Riel v.
Gannon, 16x Pa. 289.4Perry v. Scott, 51 Pa. x19. Ejectment will not be appropriate to compel
a grantee to pay the consideration unless the deed made it a charge on the
land. Zentmyer. Mittower, 5 Pa. 403.
8Krebs v. Stroub, 116 Pa., 405. The question being whether an article
for such maintenance was executory, or executed, the decision that it was
executed involved the decision that the vendor, found to be a grantor, could
not compel performance by ejectment. Garver v. McNulty, 39 Pa. 473.
6Brown v. Metz, 5 W. 164; Biddle v. Moore, 3 Pa. 161. Wheeling etc.
R.R.Co. v. Gourley, 99 Pa. 171.
'Biddle v. Moore, 3 Pa., 16x,
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preclude the vendor's ejectment. When A, a lessee, transfers a
lease by an article which stipulates that "the title of the property
shall not pass until payment in full," he can maintain ejectment for
the purchase money'. If B pays all he owes on his contract of pur-
chase, to A, the vendor, and directs A to convey and A accord-
ingly conveys, to C, on C's promise to pay certain debts of B, B
cannot expel C from the possession, in order to compel his paying
those debts. The remedy is upon the contract. If the vendor's
title as well as the vendee's is sold upon a lien originating prior to
the contract, the Vendor cannot use ejectment to enforce payment
of any portion of the purchase money, unless a trust results to
him from the purchase at judicial sale. The purchase by the
vendee at the sale is necessary to preserve his own interest and if
he buys with his own money, without fraud, he does not hold
subject to any trust for the vendor3 . A agrees to convey to a
railroad company, a strip 66 feet wide, at any time after the ex-
piration of five years, and the company agrees to pay $450 with
interest from date upon the tender of a deed. Subsequently A con-
veys the farm over which the strip runs, to X, the deed contain-
ing these words: "The present grantor reserving to himself, his
heirs and assigns, all damages arising from the running of the
Hempfield Railroad through the above described tract of land;
also reserving the right to convey the right of way through said
land to the said Hempfield Railroad Company, at any time the
said company may pay the said grantor the damages heretofore
agreed upon." After the conveyance to X, A can not maintain
ejectment against the railroad company, to compel payment of
the consideration. Though the grantee is a married woman,
ejectment will not lie to enforce the performance by her of the
contract5. But, retaining the legal title, her vendor may employ
this action to secure payment of the purchase money.
'Brown v. Dewitt, i3 Pa. Pa. 455
2Myers v. Myers, 25 Pa. ioo. Nor is there a trust that can be enforced
by ejectment.
3Thompson v. Adams, 55 Pa., 479.
4Wheeling etc. R.R. Co. v. Gourley, 99 Pa., 17I.
5Vaughan v. Ledyard i4 Phila. 276; Bortz v. Bortz, 48 Pa., 382.
6Love v. Jones, 4 W. 465; Moody v. Vandyke, 4 Binn. 31; Mitchell v.
DeRoche, i Y, 12; Marlin vs. Willink, 7 S & R., 297.
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The Plaintiff,
The vendor himself, so long as- he is the owner, may bring
ejectment. On his death, his heirs' or his devisee may bring it,
though the vendor had not possession when he died. His grantee,
if he buys with notice of the equity of the vendee, buys subject
thereto, dnd he can enforce the vendee's performance of so much
of the contract as remains unperformed'.
The Defendant.
The person who is in possession in pursuance of the contract
of sale, immediately or mediately, is the proper defendant to the
vendor's ejectment. Ordinarily it is the vendee himself. If he
has died, devising the land to an executor, the executor would be
the proper party' as would be the heir of the vendee in possession,
but not his administrator if not in possession'. The vendee of
the vendee whether by a voluntary sale5, or by a judicial sale6 may
be the defendant. The land( a leasehold) maybe transferred as col-
lateral security for a debt, and both the vendee and his assignee
may be made defendants. Doubtless the vendor might estop him-
self from claiming the land, if he caused the buyer from the vendee
to buy under the impression that all the purchase money had been
paid8 . One who, claiming adversely to both the vendor and vendee,
recovers the possession from the latter by ejectment, may be sued in
ejectment by the vendor for the purpose of testing the relative
merits of their titles, but not with a view to compelling him to pay
the purchase money under the contract to which he is in no way
privy'. The vendee of the vendee of the primary vendee may be
'Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa-, i6i.
'Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa., 112. The vendee's possession, at the time of the
grant, is notice to the grantee; Cf. Riel v. Gannon, 161 Pa. 289.
'Reed v. Murray. ii Pa, 334.
4Thompson v. Adams, 55 Pa., 479.
5Lippincott v. Low, 68 Pa., 314. If the sale takes place pending the ven-
dor's ejectment, the purchaser may be substituted as defendant.
6Creigh v. Shatto, 9 W. & S., 83; Jackson v. Maginness 14 Pa., 331; Bid-
dle v. Moore, 3 Pa., x61.
7Brown v. McDevitt, 131 Pa., 455. But the vendee does not need to
make the mortgagee of the vendee a party. Maxson's.Appeal, 75 Pa. 176.
The Court may allow a lien creditor of the vendee to pay the money found
due by the conditional verdict and order that he be reimbursed from the
subsequent sheriff's sale of the land as the vendee's on any lien then exist-
ing. Snyder v. Beidleman, 8 Luz. Leg. Reg. 261.
8Brown v. Devitt, 131 Pa. 455.
9Williams v. Irwin, 99 Pa. 37. If the vendor recovers at all it will be
without conditional verdict,
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the defendant'. The defendant may be the vendee's tenant'. After
A makes the contract to sell land to B, he may convey the land
to X. He may then buy the interest of B. In X's ejectment
against A, he can enforce the equity'. The vendee may be a
railroad company, and the land may be a part of its road. Its
duty to pay the consideration may be enforced by ejectment.'
The Subject of the Ejectment.
The subject of the ejectment may be a fractional no less than
an integral interest. One tenant in common5 , or one partner' may
convey his interest to the other, and employ the ejectment to com-
pel the vendee's performance of his contract. The ejectment
does not need to embrace all the land covered by the contract. A
contracts to sell to B two tracts containing altogether 441 acres at
an average price of $14.54 per acre. For default on B's part, A
may bring ejectment for one of them, and in it the verdict may
require the dntire purchase money to be paid. If it should be paid,
this fact would prevent the success of a second ejectment for the
other tract. A agrees to sell a tract of land, and the right to
take timber from another tract for an entire consideration. Pos-
session is taken of the first tract. Ejectment lies for this, to com-
pel the performance of the whole contract'. The interest sold
may be a leasehold of fifteen years. Ejectment will lie by the
seller to coerce payment of the price9.
The Contract.
The contract will not be an equity, of which the vendee may
make use, to defend the action, unless it is enforceable. If it is
not in writing, it is of no avail to the vendee unless the posses-
sion of the vendee was taken in pursuance of it. If possession
began before the contract", or if it was taken after the vendor for-
bade his doing so" or if it was not exclusive of the vendor" it
'Napier v. Darlington, 70 Pa., 64.
'Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa., x12. The tenant of the veedee's vendee; Jackson
v. McGinness, 24 Pa., 331.
'Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa., 1 r2.
4Daubert v. Penna. R. R. Co., T.55 Pa. 178.
5Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa., 161: Lippincott v. Law, 68 Pa., Y4.
6Biddle v. Moore. 3 Pa., 161.
7Roddy v. Harah, 62 Pa., 229.
'Carmalt v. Platt, 7 W. 318.
9Brown v. Devitt, 13, Pa., 455.
"0Chadwick v. Felt, 35 Pa., 305.
"Baxter v. Doane, 208 Pa.. 585. Cf. Goucher v. Martin, 9 W., io6.
12Hasletv. Haslet 6 W. 464.
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avails nothing. Besides the possession, payment of all or some
of the consideration is necessary,' or the making of improvements
which cannot be adequately compensated by. damages2 . If the
facts exist which make the contract enforceable, the defendant
may avail himself of it'. It is not intended here, to exhibit the
principles under whose governance courts enforce oral contracts
despite the statute of frauds. The vendor may be a married wo-
mon, and her contract may not have been signed by her husband,
or though signed by him, may not have been acknowledged.
Being void, it cannot be set up to defeat or qualify her recovery,
in an ejectment by her founded on her legal title'; nor need she
even return the purchase money as a pre-condition to the dispos-
session of the vendee. That the vendee has made improvements
costing six times as much as the price of the land, will not create
an available equity6 . What the married woman can do, her heirs,
after her death, can do. They can recover the land despite the
contract, not executed as the law prescribes in order to bind a.
married woman7. If the vendor was induced to make the con-
tract by the vendee's misrepresentation as to the quantity of iron
ore on the premises, or as to the other properties that affect its
value, he may, unless he has too long delayed, or otherwise pre-
cluded himself, recover the land unconditionally8 . The contract
may be for an option to buy within a limited time. If the option
is exercised within that time, the vendee has the ordinary rights
of a buyer.
1Bassler v. Niesly, 2 S. & R., 352. Payment alone will not take the case
out of the statute; Goucher v. Martin, 9 W., io6.
2McGibbony v. Burmaster 53 Pa., 332..
3Gordonier v. Billings, 77 Pa., 498.
4Rumfelt v. Clemens, 46 Pa.,455; Kirkland v. Hepselgefser, 2 Gr. 84.
5Glidden v. Strumpler, 52 Pa. 400.6GIiden v. Strumpler, 52 Pa., 400.
7Kirk v. Clark, 59 Pa., 479.
8Hawk v. Greensweig, 2 Pa., 295. Cf. Fisher v. Worrall, 5 W. & S., 478.
Two partners dissolved partnership, dividing the property. If the provision
by which A agrees that B shall have a certain tract, is independent of the
rest, A can enforce payment of the agreed price by ejectment. Lippincott
v. Low, 68 Pa., 314; Biddle v. Moore, 5 Pa. i61.
9Kerr v. Day, 114 Pa., 112; Napier v. Darlington, 70 Pa., 64, In Miles
v. Williamson, 24 Pa., 135, it was said that a vendor could not recover if the
vendee had made valuable improvements and he had been induced to enter
into the contract by fraudulent representations as to the vendor's title, that
title being, as to nearly all the land, bad. But why? Can the vendee keep
the land and not pay for it? Evidently on the vendor's compensating for
the improvements he should be allowed to recover the land or the purchase
money.
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Termination of the Equity.
The right of the vendee in the contract may have been ex-
tinguished before the vendor's ejectment is brought, or is termi-
nated by trial, verdict and judgment. The contract might be re-
scinded by cancelling the articles or by an endorsement on their
back, or by a separate writing; or also when the contract is oral,
by a giving back of the possession by the vendee1. But a
written contract may be given up without cancllation or surrender
of the writing from the vendor. If, dissatisfied with the contract,
the vendee procures the assent to his oral relinquishment of his
rights, from the vendor, who, acting upon it, conveys the land to
another, the vendee cannot reassert his equity against the grantee.
especially if the land has risen in value meanwhile ' . If a written
contract can be given up without a writing, a fortiori can a parol
contract, although possession of the premises has been had by the
vendee for a considerable time, and he has made several partial
payments. These may by a subsequent parol agreement, be con-
verted into payments on account of rent, the vendee agreeing to
become a tenant, instead of purchaser'.
Abandonment and Forfeiture.
Doubtless a contractual right to a conveyance may be lost
by abandonment. The vendee may never take possession or hav-
ing taken it, withdraw from it. He may fail to make payments
for a long period. The land may be meantime rising in value.
His conduct may not unreasonably have induced the vendor to
believe thdt he had purposed never to perform the contract, or
require performance from him. When however the contract has
been in part executed by the vendee; when he has taken posses-
sion and retained it for a series of years, making improvements
upon the land, the necessary evidence of subsequent abandon-
will be stringently strong. If certain payments are to be made
only upon the tender of a deed, the vendor who has not made the
tender, cannot allege the failure to make these payments, as proof
of an abandonment, but failure to pay, even upon tender of the
deed, could not be construed, into an abandonment, the vendee
'Dixon v. Oliver, 5 W., 5o9; Lauer v. Lee, 42 Pa., i65.
2fBoyce v. McCulloch, 3 W. & S., 429; Cf. Dayton v. Newman, xg Pa.,
i98. Garver v. McNulty, 39 Pa., 485; Lauer v. Lee, 142 Pa., 165.
3McClure v. Jones, 121 Pa., 55o.
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having been in possession and made improvements. Doubtless
the contract might condition the continuance of the vendee's
rights upon his compliance with the covenants, and, on non-com-
pliance, the vendor might resume possession and control. If the
vendee has agreed to remain on the premises, and that being off
for six months will entitle the vendor to treat the contract as at an
end and to dispose of the premises to another, and if the vendee
goes off for four years, and the vendor sells to another, the latter
may recover the land from the first vendee who has returned to
it, by an absolute verdict and judgment'. But a stipulation in
the contract that upon the vendee's failure to make the payments
of purchase money at the prescribed times, the vendor shall have
the right "to take possession of the premises and sell the same to
any other person on a notice to be given to the said vendee of 24
hours," does not provide for an extinction of the equity. Neither
the .vendor's resumption of possession, nor his conveyance of the
land to another, in pursuance of this reserved right, would ex-
tinguish the vendee's right to resume performance and obtain a
conveyance.'
Purchase by another, without notice of first Vendee's Equity.
The interest of a vendee may be defeated by his failure to
put his contract upon record, and also to take and retain posses-
sion of the premises, and by a subsequent purchase of the land by
another, who has no actual notice of the prior contract'. The
vendee's possession, if exclusive and visible, will be notice to oth-
ers, of his interest, since they are bound to inquire of one in pos-
session, by what right he is there. But the possession must be
so direct and exclusive that it would be likely to come under the
notice and observation of strangers or purchasers2 . Thepres-
ence of a tenant of the vendee, would be as good notice of the
vendee's right as that of the vendee himself2 .
The Act of Aptil 22d. 1856.
The 6th section of the act of April 22d, 1856', enacts that
no action shall be maintained for the specific performance of any
'Hawk v. Greenswieg, 2 Pa., 295.
2Emeryv. DeGolier, 117 Pa. 153.
3Welch v. Emerson, 95 Pa., 251.
'Boyce v, McCulloch, 3 W. & S. 429.
2Boyce v. McCulloch, 3 W. & S., 426.
3Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa., iI2.
41 P. & L., 2683.
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contract but Within five years after such contract was made, un-
less such contract shall give a longer term for its performance or
there has been in part a substantial performance or such con-
tract shall have been acknowledged by writing to subsist, by the
party to be charged therewith, within the same period. When
the vendee has been in possession for all the time since the mak-
ing of the contract, except a period less than five years this stat-
ute will not defeat the equity which he sets up in the vendor's
ejectment. A vendee who has been in possession for upwards of
20 years, is not debarred from availing himself of his contract be-
cause five years have elapsed since it was made.1
Default of Vendee as precondition to Action.
The ejectment of the vendor is based upon his legal title.
That at law, is sufficient to warrant his recovery. In order to
prevent this recovery, the vendee must appeal to the equitable
principles, in deference to which a chancellor would arrest the ven-
dor in the assertion of his legal power. In Pennsylvania the Judge
of the court of Common Please is the administrator both of the
vendor's legal rights, and of the vendee's equity. It is the habit
of courts of equity to consider the rights of the parties not merely
at the inception of the suit, but at the time of making the decree.
Hence, an ejectment will not be defeated, because, when it was
begun, the vendee, in possession, was in no default, if he has fallen
into default before the decree. Though the vendee is bythe contract
not bound to make any payments until the proper deed is ten-
dered, and the vendor begins suit without tendering a deed, he
may recover a conditional, and eventually (the condition not be-
ing fulfilled) an absolute judgment3 ; as he also may though he has
not been able to deliver a deed clear of encumbrances, until a
later time; and since that time has made no tender. If there is
any default on the vendee's part, e. g. if the purchase money is
payable in seven years, with annual interest meantime, eject-
ment may be brought immediately after the failure to pay the
first year's interest'. It is clear that if the vendee has fully per-
formed his contract, when the ejectment is brought, the vendor
'Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa., 1x. Cf., Clark v. Trindle, 52 Pa., 492.
2Shaw v. Bayard, 4 Pa., 257.
3Hawk v. Greensweig, 2 Pa., 295.
4Allen v. Woods, 24 Pa. 76; Shaw v. Bayard, 4 Pa,, 257.
5Ewing v. EWing, 96 Pa., 88r.
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mtst fail' but the acceptance of renewal notes for those originally
given for the purchase money, at their maturity, is not to be con-
sidered as a payment of the purchase money'.
Form of the Consideration.
The contract may require the vendee to pay a sum of money
to the vendor, and to pay certain debts of the vendor. Payment
of the debts may be enforced by ejectment. The consideration
may be payable in lumber, whose value is to be estimated at the
customary price. 'An acceptance of the lumber by the vendor,
without objection, precludes his subsequently alleging that it was
not merchantable'.
The Verdict. The Time Given.
When the defendant has shown no equitable right either to
prevent a recovery altogether, or to.prevent a recovery unless he
shall perform certain stipulations of his contract, the verdict and
the judgment will be absolute. If he has shown facts which en-
title him, on the performance of certain acts, to retain the pos-
session, the verdict will be for the plaintiff, subject to the condi-
tion that it shall be defeated if within a certain time, the defend-
ant shall perform these acts. Generally, time is not of the es-
sence of a contract of sale and purchase of land, and, when the
court finds that the case before it is of this class, it will equitably
extend for the vendee the period for his performance. The judge
sitting as a chancellor, deputes to the jury' the decision as to how
much time shall be given the vendee for the payment of unpaid
purchase money. The time ought apparently to be adjusted with
regard to the magnitude of the sum to be paid, the length of the
period of the default, etc., but the actual verdicts are somewhat
capricious7 . If the verdict dmits to name any time, the Supreme
'If all that is due is tendered before suit, and the tender is kept up, the
vendor would fail in the action. Cf. Thompson v. McKinley, 41 Pa., 350.2Brown v. Devitt, 13L Pa., 455.
Biddle v. Moore, 3 Pa., 161.
4Carmalt v. Platt, 7 W. 38.
51f the case is tried by a referee he, or on exception to his report, the
court, fixes the condition. Moore v. Habel, 3 Kulp, 310.
6When the unpaid part of the purchase money is but a small part of the
price, and is much less than the value of the land, the disposition is to give
a more liberal time to complete the payment, Creigh v. Shatto, 9 W. & S.,
82, Connolly v. Miller, 95 Pa. 513.
'Huston, J said the time allowed should be reasonable, and might be
short or more extended, according to circumstances; Dixon v. Martin, 5 W.
509.
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court may for that reason reverse', or, more sensibly, since that
court is also a body of chancellors, it may supplement the verdict
by fixing a time'. Possibly the trial court could do the same.
If for any reason, the entry of final judgment is suspended e. g.
by the pendency of a motion for a new trial', or by an appeal', the
trial or the appellate court, on entering the judgment may give a
longer time various times appear in the verdicts; e. g. $12,961
to be paid in three weeks5 , $65 and interest, to be paid in 30 days6
$1,086.40 to be paid in 30 dayse, $2,975.33 to be paid in three
equal instalments, in four, eight and iwelve months; $2,000 to
be paid in 45 days, and $1,251 in 60 days.9
Judgment Confessed.
The defendant may waive a verdict, by confessing a judg-
ment to be released on paying a designated sum of money in a
certain time". The confession should be distinct both as to the
amount to be paid, and as to the time of payment. The judgment
confessed being "to be released on the payment of the amount due
on the article, according to a survey to be made by judge Irwin,"
five years afterwards a habere Jacias hossessioniem issued to set
agide which a rule was taken. This rule was made absolute.
Another writ was issued and executed by delivery of the land to
the plaintiff. An affidavit showing that most of the purchase
money had been paid before the issue of the habere facias, and
that the plaintiff had not caused the survey to be made, without
which it was impossible to know the amount of the purchase
money, the court set aside the writ, awarded restitution, opened
the judgment, and awarded an issue to ascertain the facts. The
jury at the trial of the issue, rendered a verdict for the plaintiff,
'Thompson v. McKenley, 47 Pa., 353.
2Kensipger v. Smith, 94 Pa., 384.
3Pendleton v. Richey. 32 Pa., 58; Conolly v. Miller 95 Pa. 513..
'Daubert v. Penna. R. R. Co., 155 Pa., 178; Miles v. Williamson, 24 Pa.,
,35. Hall v. Clearfield, etc., Railway Co., x68 Pa. 64; Creigh v. Shatto, 9
W. & S. 82. In Maxson's Appeal 75 Pa., 176, where the arbitrators had giv-
en a conditional judgment, it was said that the court, in disposing of the ap-
peal should give an extension, not greater than that given by the arbitrators.
5Maxson's Appeal, 75 Pa., 176.6Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa., x6i.
'Welch v. Emerson, 95 Pa., 25i.
8Connolldy v. Miller, 95 Pa., 513.
1Moore v. Habel, 3 Kulp, 32o.
'°Boyd v. McNaughton, 51 Pa., 2z5; Beatty v. Hamilton, 227 Pa., 72;
Harmar v. Holton, 25 Pa., 245; Chew v. Phillippi, 32 Pa., 205.
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to be released on the payment of $297.50, and costs within 90
days; the plaintiff filing a deed'.
Failure to Perform within the Time.
Within the time mentioned in the verdict, or award of
arbitrators, or confession of judgment, for the performance by
the defendant of his duties under the contract, he must perform:
otherwise his equity will be extinct. /In Youst v. Martin2, before
conditional verdicts had come into use, it was held, that the re-
covery in ejectment by the vendor, did not work a dissolution of
the contract, but the subsequent neglect of the vendee to perform
would induce a chancellor to treat it as abandoned. "Since then,"
says Gibson, C. J.' "conditional verdicts have been brought into
use by the inconvenience of leaving the question of rescission an
open one; by which the circumstances necessary to determine it
with certainty are settled beforehand. The purchaser is to be
relieved from the operation of the jufdgment on performance of a
condition of which time is an essential part; and if he be found
in default at the day, no more is to be done for him; he goes out
of possession and the vendor becomes again the absolute owner.
By the present plaintiff's failure to pay at the time appointed in
the verdict the contract of purchase ceased to bind the rights of
either party in any respect." The vendee's equity is extinct with
the lapse of the time without performance. The act of April
21st, 1846' enacts that in all ejectments "to enforce the payment
of purchase money, wherein time becomes of essence in the find-
ing of the jury, or in a judgment by confession, by fixing a time
for such payment," * * * "a failure to pay the money
within the time so fixed, shall be deemed a rescission of the con-
tract between the parties, and shall render such judgment abso-
lute." It is not necessary in order to extinguish the equity, that
a haberefacias Possessionem should issue but, a fortiori, after
the issue and execution of that write or after the vendee's sur-
'Harmar v. Holton, z5 Pa., 245. In Todd v. Pfoutz 3 Y, 177, the judg-
ment for the vendor was absolute, but the court gave a stay of execution to
enable the vendee, meantime, to pay the purchase money.
23 S. & R., 423.
3Treaster v. Fleisher, 6 W. & S., 137.
'Chew v. Phillipi, 32 Pa., 2o5; Hill v. Gliphant 41 Pa., 364; Gordonier v.
Billings, 77 Pa., 498.
51 P. & L., 1703.
'Maxson's Appeal, 75 Pa., 176.
7Damon v. Bache, 55 Pa., 67. A judicial sale of the vendee's interest,
after the issue of the habere does not prolong the equity.
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render of the possession1 will the vendee's right be extinct2 . It
follows from the expiration of the vendee's equity, with that of
the time allowed by the verdict, that thereafter the trial court has
no power to revive it, by extending the time for performance.
The confession of judgment prescribed that the purchase money
be paid on or before Feb. 1st, 1868. On Feb. 3d a motion was
made for leave to issue a habere. The hearing was postponed
until Feb. 23d when the defendant paid the money into court,
with interest and costs. It was error for the court thereupon to
refuse to allow the issue of the habere.3
Extension by the Plaintiff.
Although the court may not, after the lapse without payment,
of the period allowed by the conditional verdict and judgment,
.extend the time, the vendor himself may. He may do this ex-
plicitly; or implicitly. With the extinction of the vendee's equity,
there is likewise an extinction of the vendor's right to any part
of the unpaid purchase money. If the vendor assigns the money
fixed in the verdict, after it has become due, he precludes himself
from asserting that the debt and therefore that the equity, are
extinct. A verdict required $90 to be paid on June 1st, 1864,
and $45 to be paid on June 1st. 1865. On May 7th, 1864, the
vendor assigned the last of these installments to X, and on Aug.
17th, 1864, when default with respect to the instalment of 1864 had
been committed, assigned that installment to Y. The court could
not properly authorize the issue on Feb. 11, 1865, of a habere
facias. The assignment of the instalment of 1864, "was an un-
equivocal acknowledgment that the defendant continued to be his
debtor, and that his equity was not foreclosed. And it was a
notice to the defendant to pay to the assignee. Since the extinc-
tion of the equity would also extinguish the second installment,
to permit it would be to allow the plaintiff to defraud his assignee
of it. Whether the prolongation of the equity is indefinite, and
what would be necessary again to put a term -to it, do not appear.
The attorney* for the plaintiff, cannot, without express authority,
validly extend the time of performance.'
1Arnold v. Fitzgerald, 76 Pa. 385; Pott's Appeal, 5 Pa., 5ox.
2Chew v. Phillippi, 32 Pa., 205; Beatty v. Hamilton, 127 Pa., 71.
3Potts' Appeal, 5 Pa., 5o1; Arnold v. Fitzgerald- 76 Pa., 385; Reynolds
v. Northrop. 5 Kulp, 421.
4Boyd v. McNaughton, 5x Pa., 225.
5Beatty v. Hamilton, 127 Pa., 71; Gable v. Hain, x Pa. W., 264.
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Conditions Affecting Payment.
There are some conditions which the court may annex to the
vendee's duty to pay, as defined by the verdict. The verdict e.g.
requiring the vendee to pay $65 with interest in 30 days, the
court may two weeks after the verdict, give leave to the defend-
ant to pay the money into court, and direct that it be not taken
out by thE plaintiff until he shall file a deed. "It was entirely
within the power of the judge acting as a chancellor" said Thomp-
son, J., "to make the order he did * * * It is manifest if he
did not take such a step, either the defendant would be obliged to
pay his money to the heirs [plaintiffs] to save the condition of
the verdict and then run the risk of ever getting a deed, or on
failure to pay, lose the land 1." There being a possible lien of a
legacy on the land, payable more than 20 years ago, the court
modified the finding of a referee so as to require that a proper
portion of the purchase money be paid into court there to remain
until the vendor should file a bond with two sufficient sureties, to be
approved by the court, conditioned to indemnify the defendant
against the legacy2. If the condition is uncertain, the court may
reduce it to certainty, either without the aid of a jury, or, by di-
recting an issue, with such aid3.
The Purchase Money.
The money payable under the contract, and already due
when the action was begun, or which has become due since the
commencement of it4 must be included in the verdict. The con-
tract may have been for an exchange of land between A and B.
B was to convey two pieces to A, and A one piece to B. B took
possession of A's lot, but failed to convey his pieces to A. In A's
ejectment to recover his lot from B, the jury's verdict was for the
lot "to be taken off and entered for the defendant, upon condi-
tion that the defendant file in the office of the prothonotary, on
or before April 1st, 1873, a title to the plaintiff" for the two pieces
which he was to convey to A, "and that before the plaintiff
shall take or receive said title, he shall file in the prothonotary's
1Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa., x61. The court set aside a haberefacias
issued without filing the deed. Cf. Connolly v. Miller, 95 Pa., 513; Boyd v.
McNaughton 54 Pa., 225. If the money is paid into court but the vendor
refuses to take it and deliver a deed, the vendee must file a bill in equity to
compel him; Riel v. Gannon, 161, Pa., 289.2Moore v. Habel, 3 Kulp, 31o; Cf. Fisher v. Worrall, 5 W. & S., 478.
3Henry v. Raiman, 25 Pa., 354. Not a case of vendor and vendee.
4Lauer v. Lee, 42 Pa., 165.
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office, a title to the defendant for all lands described in said writ.
Defendant to pay the costs by the 1st of April, 1873 "1. The ven-
dee, a railroad company, was required by the verdict in Daubert
v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.2 to pay the money it had agreed to
pay, and the costs of suit, to protect a spring of water, and to
make a crossing for the vendor, as it had covenanted to do, with-
in 6o days. The verdict must ascertain the amount of money to
be paid'. If after A has contracted to sell laud to B, he sells part of
it to C, the price which he gets from C is not a credit upon B's
equity'. The cost of defending an unsuccessful ejectment by a
hostile claimant cannot be deducted from the purchase money' .
If the price is to be paid in bricks, at the rate of $4 per thousand,
the vendee must ask where he is to deliver them. If he makes
no effort to do so, the vendor may recover the price in money'.
Unconditional Verdict.
Although when the action commences the vendee may be in
default, he may, at the trial or before, pay the money into court,
and so render a conditional verdict inappropriate. Unless the
amount paid was enough to pay not only the purchase money
but the costs that had accrued, the plaintiff is entitled to a ver-
dict for nominal damages and costs7. The defendant should re-
quest a conditional verdict. If he does not, an absolute judg-
ment will be recovered against him'. In 1791, after such ajudg-
ment had been recovered, the supreme court said" Let the defend-
ant tender his money, and he can then recover back his land. '" A
similar opinion is expressed by Sharswood J. 0
'Gordonier .. Billings, 77 Pa., 498.
2 55 Pa. 178.
3Harmar v. Holton, 25 Pa., 245.
4McClure v. Jones, 12 Pa., 55o.
5Kane v. Fischer, 2 W., 236. If the vendee is to deliver 5o,ooo bricks to
the vendor and, on the vendor's order he delivers some of them to X, he
cannot claim this delivery as a credit, if he subsequently recovers the price
of the bricks from X. Allen v. Woods, 24 Pa., 76.
6Allen v. Woods, 24 Pa., 76.
7Cadwalader v. Berkheiser, 32 Pa., 43.
8Chadwick v. Felt, 35 Pa., 305.
9Mitchell v. DeRoche, i Y., 12. In Marlin v. Willink, 7 S. & R., the
court declined to say what redress the vendee would have, after an uncon-
ditional judgment. He had paid one half of the purchase money and been
long in possession.
18Welch v. Emerson, 95 Pa., 251.
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Condition Requiring Vendor to Pay.
When the vendee, having been in possession, has made valu-
able improvements and paid a portion of the purchase money,
and the vendor is unable to make a good title, the vendee may
elect to rescind, but insist upon compensation for the damages he
will suffer from the non-fulfilment by the vendor of his contract
to give a good title. The vendor will not be permitted to eject
'him, until he makes the compensation, which may be secured by
a conditional verdict'. In Richardson v. Kuhn2 , the plaintiff in-
sisting that the defendant must either pay the purchase money
or surrender the possession, however defective the title, the su-
preme court remarks, "it is to be presumed that he bargained for
a title, and should it appear that it is not in the plaintiffs' power
to make it, they may not call on him to turn out, without re-
scinding the bargain, restoring purchase-money paid, and tendering
compensation for intermediate improvements." If the defendant
has committed waste on the premises, a compensation for this
must be deducted from the damages to be allowed to him for the
loss of his improvements and the purchase money paid3 .
The Title of the Vendor.
Ordinarily the vendee contracts for a good title. He may
however, buy only the "right, title and interest" of the vendor.
If he gets the very land which he wishes to buy, although the
contract describes it as within a certain survey, when it is with-
in a different one, he suffers no loss if the title is just as good or
as bad as it would have been, had the tract been in the other sur-
vey. Hence he must pay all the purchase money he has agreed
to pay or lose the land4 . Even when the vendee has not been
content to take the risk of the title, its badness will be no defense
in an action of ejectment, to a recovery, conditioned upon the
payment of the purchase money. He may however elect to re-
scind. and then an unconditional judgment may be bad against
him, unless he has paid all or some of the purchase money, or has
"Erwin v. Myers, 46 Pa. 96.
'6 W. 299. In Congregation v. Miles, 4 W., 146 Huston J., suggested as
the only remedy of the vendee, to give up the possession, when the title was
defective, and to sue the plaintiff.
3Irwin v. Myers, 46 Pa., 96.
4Miles v. Williamson, 24 Pa., 135. The fact that he has put improve-
ments upon the land is immaterial.
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made valuable improvementse. The fact that the defendant has
bought the land from the vendee, paying for, will not entitle him
to retain it without paying the original vendor jor it, because the
title is bad. The payment which requires reimbursement is one
made to the plaintiff2 . When purchase money only has been
paid by the vendee-no 'improvements having been made-the
vendor on repaying it, may obtain an absolute verdict and judg-
ment'. It follows that it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove
that his title is good, in order to support a recovery, unless the
vendee is shown to have paid all or some of the price, and made
improvements and when it is necessary to show a good title, it is
sufficient that the vendor has it at the trial, although he may not
have had it when he commenced the action. If it appears that
the vendee has paid some of the purchase money or has made im-
provements, he may retain the land until reimbursed, and he may
show the badness of the title or insist on proof of its goodness and
avoid a verdict requiring him to pay any of the purchase money,
and obtain a verdict conditioning his ejection upon the tender of
reimbursement.
Title Bad avto Part of the Land.
The title of the vendor may be good as to an undivided half,
third, etc., and bad on the other half, two-thirds, etc. The v'en-
dee of the integral interest is not compellable to accept this frac-
tional interest. He may elect to rescind, and, doing so, he may
retain the possession of all, until he has been repaid any pur-
chase money paid and compensation for any improvements. He-
may elect to accept such title as the vendor has. If he does so,
he must pay a proportionate part of the contract price. If he
elects to receive an undivided half or two undivided fifths he must
pay one half or two fifths of the price. If he has already paid
so much, he will be entitled to an absolute verdict and judgment
for the corresponding fractional interest. If he has not fully paid
the proportional part, the verdict will be for the plaintiff for the
half or two fifths, conditioned to be released on the defendant's
paying the as yet unpaid portion of one half or two fifths of the
price. The vendee electing to take the undivided interest, which
can be effectually conveyed by his grantor, will not be required
'Nicholl v. Carr, 35 Pa., 381; Jackson v. McGinness, 14 Pa., 331; Con
gregation v. Miles, 4 W., 146; Treaster v. Fleisher, 7 W. & S., 138. Cf.
Smith v. Webster, 2 W. 478.
2Jackson v. McGinness, 14 Pa., 331.
3Gans v. Renshaw, 2 Pa., 34,
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by the verdict to pay the whole purchase money into court, there
to remain until the vendor procures and tenders a good title to
the whole landf fr this would expose the vendee to liability to
the true owner for mesne profits if he retained possession of the
part not belonging to the vendor. It would also deprive him of
the use of the money for an indefinit time, without guaranty
that he would ever procure a good title'.
Encumbrances.
Besides defects of title, there may be encumbrances remov-
able by the vendor or one who buys from him. The existence of
such an encumbrance when the contract is made, is no obstacle
to the vendor's ejectment, if it has been removed before the com-
mencement of the action2 nor even if it continues down to the
verdict and judgment. If the encumbrance is for a sum of money
less than the purchase money, the verdict might provide for the
application of that money to it. If -the encumbrance arise after
the contract, it would bind only the purchase money, and not
the vendee's interest in the land. If it arise before, the purchase
money could be applied to its extinction by the conditional ver-
dict'. If there is on the land, when the contract is made, a mort-
gage payable to the vendee, the vendor may in the ejectment re-
cover a conditional verdict only for the unpaid purchase money
less the mortgage. The fact that this mortgage debt is collect-
able only out of the land, and not from the mortgagor personally,
does not prevent this set off. So, if A contracts to sell to B two
tracts, X and Y and on Y there is a mortgage previously made
by A to B which A is not personally bound to pay, that mort-
gage will be treated as part payment in A's ejectment to recover X'.
When the conditional verdict has ascertained the amount of
purchase money to be paid; and requires it to be paid into court,
to be taken out only upon the delivery of a sufficient deed, such
'Erwin v. Myers, 46 Pa.. If B under a contract with X who owns an undi-
vided third, takes possession of the whole land and subsequently makes a
contract with A who owns a third, A in enforcing the contract by ejectment,
cannot oust B from the third which he derived from X. Smith v, Webster
2 W., 478.
2Allen v. Woods, 24 Pa. 76.
3Laur v. Lee. 42 Pa. 165. Thompson J. oddly remarks that if the en-
cumbrance arising before the contract, were greater than the purchase mon-
ey the purchaser "could only blame himself for so imprudently contracting."
But surely he could not be compelled to complete the contract on pain of
losing what he had already paid and his improvements.4Roddy v. Harah, 62 Pa., 129.
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deed must be 'accepted by the vendee and he must pay the money
within the prescribed time, in order to preserve his equity, al-
though he, the vendee, has obtained an award of arbitrators in a
suit against the vendor on another account, which award exceeds
the purchase money due. The purchase money should be paid
into court, and the lien of the award will attach to it2.
Tender of a Deed.
The vendor may tender a deed and demand payment from
the vendee, before bringing his ejectment'. The vendee may be
bound to pay some of the purchase money before tender of a deed.
Ejectment could be resorted to by the vendor, without such ten-
der. But, even when the duty of the vendee to pay is condi-
tioned on the prior or simultaneous tender of a deed by the ven-
dor, the ejectment by the latter will not fail because no tender
preceded it.' The deed may be filed in court during the trial'.
The conditional verdict may require the filing by the plaintiff in
court of a deed, before taking out the purchase money, or the
court may after the verdict make an order of that purport6. When
the vendee is after the conveyance to furnish maintenance to the
vendor, the deed which the court will require will secure to him
this right7 . If the vendor is unable to make a good title to more
than one undivided half of land, and the vendee elects to take
this half, the deed required will undertake to convey only this
2Waters v. Waters, 32 Pa., 307. It will be error for the court after a
habere issues and possession is delivered to the vendor to set the execution
aside and award restitution, because of the vendee's counterclaim.
3Reed v. Murray, ii Pa,, 344. The vendor having tendered a deed
which was rejected by the vendee, because it contained a stipulation requir-
ing the vendee, a railroad campany, to maintain a railroad crossing for the
vendor, the jury conditioned the verdict for the plaintiff upon the defendant's
paying the purchase money upon the delivery of this deed, found to be in
accordance with the contract. Hall v. Clearfield, etc. Railway Co, 168 Pa.,
64.
'Smith v. Webster, 2 W., 478. Devling v. Williamson, 9 W.. 311; Cad-
walader v. Berkheiser, 22 Pa., 43; Dixon v. Oliver, 5W., 5o9; Hall v. Holmes'
4 Pa,, 25I: Hawk v. Greensweig, 2 Pa., 295; Markley v. Swartzlander, 8 W.
& S., 172; Lauer v. Lee, 42 Pa., 165. The contrary had been held in Swartz-
lander v. Purry, 2 P. & W. 145; Brown v. Metz, 5 W., 165.
5Markley v. Swartzlander, 8 W. & S., 172.
6Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa., x6j; Connelly v. Miller, 65 Pa., 513.
7Hawks v. Greenswig, 2 Pa., 295.
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half'. The deed offered should be free from erasures, but if it is
not, the supreme court on appeal, may affirm the judgment for
the plaintiff, provided that the plaintiff file in the court below a
good and sufficient deed free from erasures, before a day named;
otherwise to be reversed2 .
Execution.
For the recovery of the possession, the appropriate execu-
tion is the kaberefacias }hossessionem. For the recovery of costs, a
fCerifacias. The money found due by the conditional verdict is
not collectable by afjeri facias. If the verdict is unconditional,
the haberefacias may issue in course, without action of the court,
but if it is conditional, the court should be apprised of the failure
of the defendant to perform the condition before the writ issues.
The writ should issue only with its leave. The applicant for the
writ, makes a motion or obtains a rule to show cause. A writ
issued without leave of court may be set aside, possibly for that
reason alone; certainly if facts are made to appear which, had
application been made to the court, would have induced it to re-
fuse leave4. The court, having since verdict was entered, given
leave to the defendant to pay the money into court, to be taken out
only on the plaintiff's filing a deed, if, the money being thus
paid into court, the plaintiff, after the period mentioned in the
verdict for payment, issues a habere facias because the money
has not been paid to him, although he has not tendered a deed,
the court will set it aside'. The writ may be set aside even when
issued by leave of the court, if there is a dispute as to the amount
still due by the vendee, who alleges be has paid all he is bound
to pay, until the exact sum due is ascertained by a survey, which
it was the vendor's duty to make1 . If the vendor has since the
verdict extended the time of payment, a habere issued before the
expiration of the extension will be set aside8. If the conditional
verdict requires two payments to be made with an interval be-
'Napier v. Darlington, 70 Pa., 64.
2Markleyv. Swartzlander, 8 W. & S., 372.
3Shaw v. Bayard, 4 Pa., 257.
4Connolly v. Miller, 95 Pa., 53.
5Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa., x6x.
6Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa., i61.
7Harmar v. Holton, 25 Pa., 245.
8Boyd v. McNaughton, 5x Pa., 225.
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tween, perhaps the failure to pay the earlier installmen when
due, will entitle to a haberefacias3 .
Sale of the Premises.
On the failure of the vendee to comply with the conditions
of the verdict, the right of the vendor to recover possession, as
we have seen, becomes absolute. The equity of the vendee is ex-
tinguished. The vendee cannot procure from the court an order
to sell the land, and to award to him any excess of the proceeds,
over the unpaid portion of the purchase money4. The equity is
foreclosed; although the land may be worth $100,000, and the
defendant, having contracted to pay that sum for it, has in fact
paid all but $50. As equity has given a mortgagor a longer pe-
riod to redeem than the contract allowed, and the statute has pro-
vided for foreclosure of the mortgage only by a sale, might not a
similar provision be made with respect to a vendor's ejectment?
• Boyd v. McNaughton, St Pa., 225: The point is not decided.
'Beatty v. Hamilton, 127 Pa., 71.
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MOOT COURT.
THORNE v. HOOVER.
Receipt-Effect of receipt in full-Evidence-Conclusiveness of
Receipt.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thorne had rendered considerable services to Hoover, who intend-
ing the amount to be payment in full, but not saying so, sent by mail
to Thorne, a check for $25o. Thorne received this with no intention to
accept it in full payment, estimating his services as worth $4oo and intending
to charge that amount. He however sent a receipt to Hoover in which he
stated that the check was in full. "He was not distinctly conscious that he
was writing these words and did not intend that Hoover should understand
that he expected no further compensation." On receiving the receipt
Hooverdid understand that Thorne regarded the debt as paid. Some weeks
subsequently Thorne applied to Hoover for the further payment of the $x5o.
Hoover declining to pay, this action is brought. Ten attorneys say Thorne's
services were worth $400. None said they were not. Jury might legiti.
mately infer they were worth $400. Court said no recovery. This is a mo-
tion for a new trial.
Forsyth for the plaintiff.
Is question of fact for jury whether a paper, purporting to be a full and
final settlement, was obtained by fraud, accident, mistake or deception.
McGann v. Railroad iii Pa. i7i; Hamsher v. Kline, 57 Pa. 367.
Hoover for the defendant.
Appellant psesumed to have received check in full payment. Flynn v.
Harlock, x94 Pa. 462; Daly v. Dallmeyer, 20 Sup. 366. Receipt can only be
set aside for mistake, fraud or accident, which cause must be made to ap-
pear distinctly. Rhoad's Estate, 189 Pa. 460. Here it is oath against oath,
except defendant is also supported by the evidence of the receipt. Hence
court committed no error in not sending case to jury. Scott v. Reed, 153
Pa. 14.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
T. S. SMITH, J.-The receipt in question was only prima facie evi-
dence of a payment in full. Hamsher v. Kline, 57 Pa. 397. Nevertheless it
could only be set aside for weighty reasons such as fraud, artifice or mis-
take, and the reasons for disregarding it should be made to appear distinctly
the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff not being such evidence.
Rhoads' Estate, 189 Pa. 46o; Flynnn v. Hurlock, 194 Pa. 460; Daly v. Dall-
meyer, 26 Sup. 266.
This was clearly a proper question for the court 'to determine. Were
the plaintiff in this case permitted to set up the defense in his own testi-
mony that the receipt should be disregarded or that it was obtained by
fraud, artifice or mistake, merely because the plaintiff, as the statement of
facts shows, was not distinctly conscious of what he was writing, it would
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open the flood gates of fraud and perjury. Injustice would be oone to many
persons engaged in legitimate business transactions, in which receipts, sim-
ilar to the one given in this case, are the only evidence of settlement.
After a careful perusal of the facts we fail to discover any reason
for the admission of the attorneys' evidence. There is nothing in the state-
ment of facts to indicate that Thorne was performing legal services, and
even if this were the case we are of the opinion that their testimony should
not have been admitted.
The nonsuit sustained.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The services of Thorne, we may for the present purpose assume, were
worth $40o. He has been paid $250. He desires to be paid the remaining
$,5o. Why should he not be paid?
Hoover thought his services were worth $25o, and with this opinion,
paid him that amount. But he d id not inform Thorne that that was his
opinion. He did not conditlon the payment upon its being accepted in full
satisfaction. Surely had no receipt been given, the circumstances would
have been no obstacle to Thorne's demanding $15o more.
Thorne iricorporated in his receipt the statement that the $250 were "'in
full" of all demands. Did he by so doing estop himself from claiming more?
How did he? Hoover had already parted with the money. He could not
recover it back, nor could he in any way make Thorne's refusal to return it,
prevent his effectively demanding more. He had coupled nosuch condition
with the payment.
Was the receipt contractual in character? Evidently not. When Thorne
got the money, he had a right to take and retain it. and demand $15o more.
He unnecessarily, and without consideration, stated that he would not de-
mand more. As a contract, it is without consideration.
The receipt is simply evidential of one or of both of two things. It
may be taken as an admission by Thorne that his services were worth only
$25o. But w¢hile his admission is evidence against the correctness of his
present claim, it is rebuttable by other evidence. To make it conclusive
would be to treat it as an estoppel.
The receipt may also be deemed evidential not of the actual value of
Thorne's services, but of his purpose whether they were worth more or not,
not to demand more than the $25o. But, to make this purpose unchangeable
is to constitute it an estoppel. The purpose was not binding as a contract
as we have said. How then does it bind? Where is the principle estab-
lished, that, if A, having a right to something from B, once forms a purpose
not to demand it, or once expresses non-contractually, (and under circum-
stances which do not superinduce action by B. which,were the purpose after-
wards effectively changed, would cause a detriment to B.) the purpose not to
demand it, he is forever precluded from subsequently demandingit?
The evidence explanatory of the manner in which the words "in full"
were written, is simply intended to weaken their force as an admission.
They are not contractual. They were not demanded by Hoover, nor were
they the condition upon which he paid the money. We know no rule of law
that prevents a man, when he makes an oral admission from showing what
the fact was as he shows any other fact, although by showing what the fact
was, he indirectly shows the error of the adinission. There is no reason for
a different rnle- when the admission is written.
Judgment reversed.
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BOOK REVIEWS.
THE AMERICAN LAWYER, BY JOHN R. Dos PASOS; THE
BANKS LAW PUBLISHING CO.
This little book of 165 pages deserves more than a fugitive attention.
With the very highest ideal of the lawyer its learned author indicates
wherein he finds that the protession fails to realize it, the causes of this
failure, and the measures that promise amelioration. Not without plausibil.
ity he contenas that with the civil war came a great and in some respects a
deplorable change in the character of the bar. He emphasizes the need for
a better general training, for the revival of the study of institutional works
like'Blackstone, for the abandonment of the too exclusive study of precedents,
and he insistently proclaims the need ot deeply imbuing lawyers with the
ethics of their vocation As one of the causes of the moral decline of the
bar, he points out the fierce competition engendered by the sinster multipli-
cation of attorneys. On page 61 a table indicates that whereas there was in
i85o but one lawyer to every thousand of the population, in i9oo there was
one to every 665, the ratio having increased in every decade.
Reminding us that originally the lawyer was deemed amicus curiae, and
that his most important duty was that which sprang from this relation, he
deplores the substitution for this conception of him, that which makes his
chief duty that which he bears, to his client. But, is this view just? Thejudge is, or ought to be able to take care of himself. The attorney is the
substitute for the litigant, answering, as says Blackstone, "to the procurator,
or proctor of the civilians and canonists. And he is one who is put in the
place, stead or turn of another, to manage his matters of law." He cannot
serve God and Mammon; he cannot be a good attorney for his client, if he
is always exalting his duty of deferring to the judge.
It is somewhat startling to find a chapter devoted to the "lawyer's
political employment as a legislator." " From the commencement of the
government," remarks the author, "the lawyers have absolutely dominated
in the Federal and State Legislatures." Isut surely this is an unwholesome
condition of things, which we ought to change, instead of deeming it
perpetual and adjusting the lawyers to it. It is somewhat scandalous that
the lawyer class, one of the smallest in the state or nation, should thus have
usurped political power. What the profession and the people need, is the
larger abstention of lawyers from non-judicial affairs, and from filthy politics.
For the debauchery of the electorate, political lawyers more than any other
class, are responsible.
In all that the book says in favor of a higher standard of professional char-
acter and a broader and deeper technical training, we can heartily concur. We
need not go so far as to favor a seven years' apprenticeship, or the restoration
to their former place of authority, of the Commentaries, now 140 years old,
nor the selection of Paley, Barlamaqui and Montesquieu from the great
masters in ethics and jurisprudence, nor is it necessary for us to think that
the codification of the law by a text writer is good, but by a legislator, bad.
We may wholly appove of the author's regret at the excessive number
of lawyers, on acconnt of its demoralizing influence upon them and upon
their communities. We cannot so sincerely lament the substitution of simp-
ler and directer methods of speech, for the prolix, ornate and irrelevant or-
ations of earlier days. A court ought to be a place for the dispatch of
business, and not for the exhibition of graces of word, gesture, diction, im-
agination. Too often has justice been stabbed in her own temple, by the
deft stilletto of the unscrupulous but eloquent, impassioned and imagina-
tive advocate.
It is a painful anti-climax, that we find at the end of the book, namely
the injunction that lawyers should wear gowns. We had hoped that the
days of trust in millinery and ritual were gone at least in the United States.
"The single judge sitting in his judicial robes," says the author, "creates a
certain feeling of awe. and no matter how pusillanimous in figure or mind,
he effectually controls the vast audience .before him." But does he?
Are our audiences really so silly? And should a pusillanimous judge be
permitted if he could to impose on the people by his clothes, when in char-
acter, intelligence, and technical knowledge he is contemptible? Is not this
effort to deceive the people into an undeserved respect, dishonest and im-
moral?
But we earnestly advise and implore the readers of this notice to peruse
the book. It is able; it is interesting. It will repay both money and time.
